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Abstract
This paper studies the quantity-quality trade-o¤model of fertility,
under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting. It shows that the
lack of self-control may play a di¤erent role in a developed economy
and in a developing one. In the rst case characterized by a positive
investment in quality, the lack of self control tends to reduce fertility.
In the second case, it is possible that the lack of self-control leads both
to no investment in quality and to a higher fertility rate. It is also
proved that if parents cannot commit on their investment in quality,
a small change of parameters may lead to a jump in fertility. JEL
classication: D91, J13, O12
Keywords: endogenous fertility, quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
1 Introduction
From the seminal articles of Becker and Lewis (1973), and Becker and Tomes
(1976), the benchmark theory of fertility decisions within the family is the
quantity-quality trade-o¤model. According to this model, quality and quan-
tity of children are both endogenous variables. Fertility behaviors and invest-
ments in children human capital are consciously and jointly determined by
parents. This theory explains fertility and education behaviors as an optimal
choice of the household, depending on its income and on prices of quality and
quantity.
In this paper, I argue that this theory is built on the implicit assumption
of a perfect self-control of the household. Indeed, as education decisions
are taken after fertility choices, it is not obvious that the education decision
Paris School of Economics and University of Paris I. Address: C.E.S., Maison des
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Tel: +33 (0)1 44 07 81 98. Email : wignioll@univ-paris1.fr.
1
ex-post is consistent with the education decision planned at the time of the
fertility choice. This problem of self-control exists if agents are endowed with
a utility function with (quasi)-hyperbolic discounting.
Recently, a growing literature has been developed that stresses the as-
sumption of (quasi)-hyperbolic discount rates. It seems more consistent with
laboratory experiments that nd a negative relationship between discount
rates and time delay (see e. g. Loewenstein, and Thaler (1989)). The con-
sequences of quasi-hyperbolic discounting have been used in various frame-
works. Many articles have been concerned with savings behaviors, mainly
Harris and Laibson (2001) and Laibson (1997). Diamond and Köszegi (2003)
applied hyperbolic discounting to the early retirement pattern of workers.
Barro (1999) introduced this assumption in a standard growth model.
A recent article by Salanié and Treich (2006) made a breakthrough in
this literature. In discrete time, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is introduced
in the intertemporal utility function of the consumer by adding an extra
parameter   1 that represents the bias for the present. The instantaneous
ows of utility are weighted by the discount factors: 1; ; 2; 3; etc.
The standard assumption of exponential consumers is obtained for  = 1:
Hyperbolic consumers have a bias for the present  < 1: In order to evaluate
the impact of self-control on behaviors, most of articles have compared the
results obtained for  < 1 with the one obtained for  = 1: The point made
by Salanié and Treich is that this comparison is not appropriate to isolate
the e¤ect of self-control, as  also modies the preferences of the consumer.
The only pertinent comparison is between the behavior of a consumer with
commitment power, and the one for a consumer without this power.
In this paper I consider a simple model in which parents arbitrates be-
tween the quantity and the quality of their children. Households utility
depends on the ows of instantaneous utility obtained during three periods.
These ows are discounted with a quasi-hyperbolic discount factor. In the
rst period, self 1 chooses the quantity of children. Each Child entails a
cost in time for the household (mainly for the wife) and implies a reduction
of income. This cost comes from child rearing and primary education given
inside the family. In the second period, self 2 chooses the quality level (the
education level) given to each child. The education cost is proportional to
the number of children and to the level of quality. Finally, in the third period
the ow of utility depends positively on both quantity and quality levels.
This last assumption can be interpreted as altruistic feeling of parents that
value both the number and the quality of their children. It could also be
viewed as the total gain received from children, if they are altruistic towards
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their parents and make them a gift.
Following Salanié and Treich, the commitment solution (C in abbrevi-
ated form) for fertility and education is compared to the solution without
commitment, obtained as the Nash equilibrium reached by selves 1 and 2 in
their game. This solution is called the temporary consistent solution (TC in
abbreviated form). Two cases are studied. In the rst one, both C and TC
solutions lead to a positive investment in quality. This case in interpreted as
representing a developed economy. The impact of the absence of self control
depends on the elasticity of substitution of preferences. In the case of an
elasticity of substitution greater than one, the absence of self control implies
a smaller fertility. The investment in quality is also lower for  close to 1;
but higher for a small value of :
The second case corresponds to a situation for which the investment in
quality cancels out along the TC solution, whereas it is positive for the C-
solution. This case is thinkable for a developing economy1. It leads to a
higher fertility rate for the TC solution than for the C solution. It means
that if the household could commit on his future education investment, it
would lead to lower fertility. For instance a policy that makes compulsory
attendance in school for children can be viewed as a commitment technology,
that is expected to reduce fertility.
Comparing this model to existing literature, an important point to stress
is that it o¤ers two novel features. In other words, two characteristics make
impossible to infer directly the impact of self-control on fertility and educa-
tion from preceding works on savings, retirement behaviors, etc. The rst
characteristic is the non-linearity of the budget constraint deriving from the
quantity-quality trade-o¤. The cost of education is the product of quality
time quantity. The second characteristic comes from the property that no
investment in quality is a possible solution. This solution represents the case
of a developing economy, for which no investment in education is provided
to children, except primary education.
About the non-linearity of the budget constraint, one consequence is that
the lack of self-control may imply lower investment in quality for  close to
1; but higher investment for a small value of . This result comes from the
property that the cost of quality depends on quantity, and quantity increases
with : In a model with a linear budget constraint, the lack of self-control
has a monotonic impact.
1A third case with no investment in quality for both solutions is not studied as it is not
interesting. Indeed, for no investment in quality in both solutions, TC and C solutions
give the same value of fertility.
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The second novel feature comes from the case for which no investment
in quality is reached along the TC solution. When the quality level chosen
by self 2 cancels out, the optimal response for self 1 corresponds to a jump
of fertility. In other words, fertility is not continuous at the point for which
quality cancels out. This property is interesting, as it means that in the
neighborhood of this point, a small change of some parameter can lead to
a high change in fertility. For example, a small increase of the opportunity
cost of quantity can lead to a high reduction of fertility. This result can
be explained considering the objective function of self 1, along the TC so-
lution. When quality cancels out, the response function of self 2 undergoes
a discontinuity of its derivative. Whereas this derivative is negative for a
positive investment in quality (quality is a decreasing function of quantity),
the derivative is equal to zero when quality cancels out. As there is a discrep-
ancy between the objective functions of selves 1 and 2, the derivative of the
self 1 objective function undergoes a jump when quality cancels out. For this
reason, there generally exists two levels of fertility that are local maxima of
the objective function of self 1. If the change of a parameter leads to a jump
from one local maximum to the other, there is a discontinuity of fertility at
this point.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives the results. Section 4
concludes. An nal appendix gives the proofs.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
The model is very simple, and is restricted to a three-period quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model. In period 1, self 1 preferences are given by the utility
function:
u [w1 + w0(1  m)] + u [w2   mq] + 2u [m(q0 + q)]
with
u(x) =
x1 
1

1  1

(1)
and  > 1: m is the number of children and q the quality of each children.
Child quantity is chosen in period 1 by self 1, whereas child quality is a
decision of self 2. As usual is this literature, m is considered as a continuous
variable. Moreover, it is assumed that parents choose the same level of quality
for each child.
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In period 1, the family income consists of two parts: a constant part
w1;and a variable part w0(1 m) that depends on child quantity. w1 can be
viewed as husbands income, whereas w0 is wifes income. Giving birth and
raising one child takes a fraction  ( > 0) of wifes time. Therefore, w0 is
the opportunity cost for each child.
In period 2, the family income is w2:  is the unit cost for one unit of
quality for one child. Therefore mq is the cost to provide a quality q to each
of the m children.
In period 3, the total revenue earned by children is m(q0 + q): q0 is the
human capital level of a uneducated man. Parents care about the total rev-
enue of their children. This assumption can represent either intergenerational
altruism or implicit concern about potential support of children in old age.
Finally,  and  are two positive coe¢ cients not greater than 1.
In period 2, self 2 preferences are given by:
u [w2 +m(a  q)] + u [m(q0 + q)]
The discount factor between period 3 and period 2 is  if it is computed by
self 1, and  if it is computed by self 2. The parameter  indicates whether
there is a self-control problem ( < 1) or not ( = 1).
Following Salanié and Treich (2006), the time-consistent solution is com-
pared to the commitment solution. The time-consistent solution (called TC
in a nutshell) is the non cooperative equilibrium obtained from the game
played by selves 1 and 2. More precisely, self 2 chooses q; m being given. Self
1 chooses m; taking into account the best response function of self 2. The
commitment solution (called C in a nutshell) is obtained in assuming that
self 1 can choose both m and q:
2.2 Investment in quality
The best response function of self 2
Self 2 takes m as given and chooses q following his best response function:
qTC(m) = argmax
(q)

u [w2   mq] + u [m(q0 + q)]
s. t. q  0
The solution to this program can be interior (q > 0) or not. Dening the
threshold
mTC  (=)
 w2
q0
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the best response function of self two is:
qTC(m) =
8><>:
(=)
w2
m
 q0
1+()1 
0
if m  mTC
if m  mTC
(2)
qTC(m) is a non-increasing function of m:
The commitment solution
Assume that self 1 can commit in period 1 on a choice of q in period 2. It
is straightforward that the value of q with respect to m will be given by the
expression of qTC(m) in (2) in which  is replaced by 1. The new threshold
is
mC  (=)
 w2
q0
and q is equal to:
qC(m) =
8><>:
(=)
w2
m
 q0
1+()1 
0
if m  mC
if m  mC
(3)
qC(m) is a non increasing function of m: It is clear that, for m given,
qC(m)  qTC(m) with a strict inequality when qC(m) > 0:
Remark 1 As usual fertility rate is assumed to be a continuous variable.
This simplifying assumption leads to meaningless results form tending toward
0: Indeed, qC(m) and qTC(m) tends to be innite whenm tends toward 0; with
a discontinuity in m = 0: Thus, it will be appropriate to eliminate parameters
value leading to low fertility rates.
3 Fertility decisions under quasi-hyperbolic
discounting
This section study the impact of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on fertility and
education decisions. The time-consistent solution is compared to the commit-
ment solution. Two cases are analyzed. In the case of a developed economy,
both solutions are associated with a positive investment in education. In the
case of a developing economy, investment in education may cancel out. It is
shown that the lack of self-control may play in opposite direction on fertility
in these two cases: it decreases fertility in the developed economy, while it
increases fertility in the developing one. Finally, a complete characterization
of these two cases is provided related to parameters value.
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3.1 The developed economy
This part compares the time-consistent solution with the commitment solu-
tion, when both are interior solutions: q > 0.
The time-consistent solution
Along the time-consistent solution, self 1 chooses m; taking into account
the best response function of self 2 (2). By assumption, m is such that
qTC(m) > 0 for a developed economy. Self 1 program is:
max
m0
u [w1 + w0(1  m)] + u

w2   mqTC(m)

+ 2u

m(q0 + q
TC(m))

Dening
A() 
 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 ) 1
B 

q0
w0

the time-consistent solution is:
mTC =
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2
q0 + w0 ()
 A()B
(4)
This solution is valid only if mTC > 0; that is satised if
H()  () A()B > w2
w1 + w0
(5)
Following the preceding remark, the parameters values will be restricted
such that (5) will hold in the sequel.
The commitment solution
Along the commitment solution, self 1 chooses bothm and q: This solution
can be obtained using equation (3) with by assumption qC(m) > 0. The
program is:
max
m0
u [w1 + w0(1  m)] + u

w2   mqC(m)

+ 2u

m(q0 + q
C(m))

The commitment solution is
mC =
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2
q0 + w0 ()
 A(1)B
(6)
This solution is valid only if mC > 0; that is satised if
() A(1)B >
w2
w1 + w0
(7)
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Comparison between TC and C solutions
The only di¤erence between the two expressions (4) and (6) is the term
A() in place of A(1): As m is increasing in A; mTC < mC if and only if
A() < A(1): It is easy to nd:
d ln [A()]
d
=
(   1) 1  2(1  ) 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 )
As  < 1; A() < A(1)()  > 1:
As  > 1 has been set, mTC < mC : the time-consistent solution leads to
a lower fertility. As self 2 does not enough invest in education from the point
of view of self one, and as education choice decreases with fertility, self one
best response is a reduction in fertility. If self 2 could commit on a higher
level of quality (for instance, if he could commit on the behavior qC1 (m)), self
1 would invest more in the quantity of children.
In the opposite case  < 1; the result would be reversed. As self two
under-invests in quality, self one increases quantity with respect to the com-
mitment solution.
This result is close to the one obtained by Salanié and Treich (2006),
in a model in which the decision variable of agents is savings. Applying
their results to a CES utility function (1), they nd that the time-consistent
solution leads to undersavings i¤ > 1: But, an important result obtained in
our framework in the next part is that, in the case of the developing economy
(when qTC = 0), the e¤ect of the lack of self-control can be reversed.
In the case  < 1; the lack of self control leads to a higher fertility mTC >
mC : Therefore, it also leads to a lower quality investment : as mTC > mC ;
qC(mC) > qC(mTC) > qTC(mTC): The absence of commitment implies more
quantity and less quality.
In the case  > 1; it is not so easy to conclude on quality. Indeed, qC(m)
and qTC(m) are decreasing functions, with qC(m) > qTC(m) for a given
level of fertility m. But, as mTC < mC ; it is not possible yet to conclude
if qC(mC) ? qTC(mTC): Proposition 1 proves that parents under-invest in
quality when  is close to 1, but they overinvest for a low value of :
The following proposition summarizes the results obtain:
Proposition 2 Assuming an interior solution for m and q (m and q > 0),
 In the case  < 1; the lack of self control leads to a higher fertility
mTC > mC and a lower investment in education qC > qTC :
 In the case  > 1; the lack of self-control leads to lower investments
in quantity mTC < mC : The investment in quality is also lower for 
close to one, but higher for a low :
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Proof. See appendix 1
The sequel will only focus on the case  > 1; which leads to the most
intuitive results, and which corresponds to preceding works on savings be-
havior. As a consequence of proposition 1, for  > 1 and  close to 1; every
commitment mechanism on a higher investment in quality increases fertility.
For instance, a public policy in favor of commitment such as compulsory
school will lead to a higher fertility level. But for a weak value of ; there is
overinvestment in quality. The intuition behind this result is that, for a low
value of ; as mTC becomes weak, the cost of quality is very low.
Another consequence of the case  > 1 is that the constraint (7) is weaker
that (5). Therefore, only (5) will be retained.
Existence of an interior solution
The time-consistent and commitment solutions are both interior if the
following inequalities are satised: 0 < mTC < mTC , 0 < mC < mC : As
mTC < mC ; only three inequalities must be satised.
Condition mTC > 0 is given by (5).
The inequality mTC < mTC gives:
Z() <
w2
w1 + w0
(8)
with Z dened as:
Z()  1
w0
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()

1+1 
1+ 11 

Finally, the inequality mC < mC gives:
G() <
w2
w1 + w0
(9)
with
G()  1
w0
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()
(10)
It is straightforward that G() < Z(): Therefore (5) and (8) are the only
remaining constraints.
3.2 The developing economy
This part focuses on the case in which the time-consistent solution is a corner
solution with no investment in quality (qTC = 0). If the commitment solution
is also associated with no education investment (qC = 0, Z() > w2=(w1+
9
w0)), it is straightforward to see that the fertility level will be the same
for the two behaviors. Therefore, this case is not interesting as the lack of
self-control has no impact on decisions.
More interesting is the case in which the commitment solution is associ-
ated with some positive education investment (qC > 0 , Z() < w2=(w1 +
w0)). In this case, the lack of commitment inuences education, and thus
fertility behaviors.
The time-consistent solution without investment in quality
Considering the TC behavior in the corner solution with qTC = 0; the
fertility level mTC is given by the rst order condition:
w0 [w1 + w0(1  m)] 1=   

m 1=q1 1=0

= 0
The solution is denoted by ~mTC and is equal to:
~mTC =
 
2

(w0)
  q 10 (w1 + w0)
1 +
 
2

(w0)
1  q 10
(11)
Using (2), condition ~mTC > mTC ensuring that qTC = 0 gives the following
inequality:
w2
w1 + w0
< D() (12)
with
D()  1
w0()
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()
(13)
Comparison with the commitment solutions
By assumption, the commitment solution is associated with some positive
education investment (qC > 0). Therefore, mC is still dened by (6), and
condition (9) must be fullled. The comparison between ~mTC given by (11),
and mC given by (6) gives the following result:
Proposition 3 When the lack of self-control leads to no investment in qual-
ity for the time-consistent solution and to a positive investment for the com-
mitment one, the fertility level is higher for the rst one.
Proof. From (11) and (6), the inequality ~mTC > mC is equivalent to
G() <
w2
w1 + w0
which holds by assumption.
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This proposition shows that the lack of self-control has a di¤erent im-
pact in the developing economy, as it tends to increase fertility. If self 2
could commit on some positive investment in quality, self 1 would invest less
in quantity. In a developed country, a policy measure that favors commit-
ment increases fertility. In a developing economy, such a measure will reduce
fertility.
The intuition behind this result is simple. For the TC solution, while
qTC remains positive, self 1 gives birth to less children in order to obtain
more investment in quality by self 2. But, when qTC cancels out, decreasing
fertility has no more impact on quality. The optimal response of self one is
now to increase his fertility level.
To understand this point, it is useful to consider the rst order condition
of the program of self 1:
0 =  w0u0 [w1 + w0(1  m)]  qu0 [w2   mq] + 2(q0 + q)u0 [m(q0 + q)]
+m
dqTC(m)
dm
f u0 [w2   mq] + u0 [m(q0 + q)]g
For the commitment solution, the rst order condition is the same, ex-
cept that dqTC(m)=dm is replaced by dqC(m)=dm: But, for the commit-
ment solution, the expression  u0 [w2   mq] + u0 [m(q0 + q)] cancels out
for q = qC(m) by denition of qC(m): For the time-consistent solution, the
expression  u0 [w2   mq] + u0 [m(q0 + q)] is positive for q = qTC(m), as
qTC(m) is dened by  u0 [w2   mq] + u0 [m(q0 + q)] = 0: This is the
consequence of the discrepancy between the objective functions of self 1 and
self 2. For the derivative dqTC(m)=dm; there is a discontinuity in mTC : this
derivative is negative to the left of mTC ; and is zero to the right.
The consequence of this analysis is that the derivative of self 1 objective
function is always continuous for the commitment solution. But, for the time-
consistent solution, the derivative of self 1 objective function is discontinuous
at the point mTC ; with a higher value to the right of mTC : It is then possible
that self 1 objective function admits two local maxima. The function is
concave on each interval
 
0; mTC

and
 
mTC ;+1 and continuous, but the
derivative is discontinuous in mTC :
Another consequence of these properties is that condition (8) under which
mTC < mTC when qTC(m) > 0 is not the opposite of condition (12) under
which ~mTC > mTC when qTC(m) = 0: When both conditions holds, it is
necessary to compare the utility levels obtained for each local maximum.
Denoting by UTC the indirect utility level when qTC is positive and ~UTC the
utility level when qTC is zero, appendix shows that the condition UTC > ~UTC
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holds i¤: 
w2
w1 + w0
w0
q0
+ 1
1 1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1 
() A()
#1=
(14)
>
"
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
#1=
+ 

w2
w1 + w0
1 1=
This inequality implicitly denes a function V () such that
UTC > ~UTC , w2
w1 + w0
> V ():
This function satises:
Z() < V () < D():
3.3 Existence of the di¤erent regimes
Technical lemma:
Lemma 4  H() is an increasing function of ;and when  goes from
0 to 1; H() goes from 0 to (q0)
 (w0)
 (1+ 1 ) > D(1): More-
over, for every ; H() > Z():
 G; Z; V and D are such that: 8 2 (0; 1) ;
G() < Z() < V () < D()
and
G(1) = Z(1) = V (1) = D(1) =
(q0)
 (w0)
 
1 + q 10 
2(w0)1 
 G increases with  and D decreases with .
This lemma allows a complete characterization of the di¤erent cases. We
restrict parameters to be such that (5) holds, or w2=(w1+w0) < H(): In this
zona, the preceding analysis has shown that the functions G() and V () are
the pertinent frontiers. The set of parameters satisfying (5) can be divided
in 3 sub-zonas.
Zona A is obtained for w2=(w1 + w0) < G(), with qC = qTC = 0 and
~mC = ~mTC : In this zona, the optimal behavior in both cases leads to no
12
investment in quality. When investment in quality cancels out, both solutions
are associated with the same level of quality.
Zona B corresponds to G() < w2=(w1 + w0) < V (); with qTC = 0 but
qC > 0 and ~m > mC : In this zona, the temporary consistent solution leads
to a higher level of fertility and no investment in children quality. If self two
could commit on a higher investment in education, self 1 would invest less in
quantity.
For zona C; such that V () < w2=(w1+w0); qTC and qC are both positive,
with qTC < qC and mTC < mC : This zona corresponds to the developed
economy with a positive investment in quality. The temporary consistent
solution leads to lower investment in quality and in quantity. If self two could
commit on a higher investment in education, self one would invest more in
quality.
A numerical illustration of these di¤erent cases is provided.
For a given value of w2=(w1+w0); it is possible that all three zones A; B
and C are successively reached depending on the value of :
Two cases may happen. In the case w2=(w1+w0) < G(1); zone A appears
for  close to 1; zone B for  such that G() < w2=(w1+w0) < V (); zone C
appears only if there exist values of  such that V () < w2=(w1+w0) < H():
In the case w2=(w1 + w0) > G(1); only zones B and C may exist because
G() is always smaller that G(1) < w2=(w1 + w0):
These results provide a complete characterization of the existence of the
three regimes with respect to the two variables  and w2=(w1+w0): A simple
numerical illustration (see gure 1) is provided for the following values of
parameters :  = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:17;  = 1; q0 = 0:5:
3.4 E¤ect of 
The parameter  is the cost of education. An increase of  changes the
optimal trade-o¤ between quality and quantity. The following proposition
summarizes the e¤ect of  on fertility and education.
Proposition 5  mC increases when the cost of education  increases,
and qCdecreases.
 If  is small enough,  < 1=(1   ); mTC increases when the cost of
education  increases, and qTCdecreases. If  > 1=(1  ); mTC can be
a non monotonic function of  :
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Proof. From (6), mC can be written:
mC =
x() (w1 + w0)  w2q0
1 + w0x()
with x()  () q 10 (w0) ( 1+ s): Taking the derivative of mC with
respect to  ; it is obtained that the sign of this derivative is the sign of the
expression:
x0() (w1 + w0) +
w2
 2q0

[1 + w0x()] 

x() (w1 + w0)  w2
q0

[w0x
0()]
= x0()

(w1 + w0) + w0
w2
q0

+
w2
 2q0
[1 + w0x()] > 0
Thus, mC is an increasing function of  :
From (3), the quality level q is such that:
q0
 + q( + ) = 
w2
mC
If  increases, as mC decreases, q must increase.
From (4), the time-consistent solution can be written:
mTC =
y() (w1 + w0)  w2q0
1 + w0y()
with y()  () q 10 (w0)  1A(): If y0() > 0; it is known from the
preceding calculation that mTC increases with  : Therefore, it remains to
check if  1A() increases with  : After some calculations, it is obtained
that
d ln [ 1A()]
d
= (   1) 1  [(1  )  1] 
 1 1 

 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 )
If (1   ) < 1; y0() > 0 and mTC increases with  : If (1   ) > 1; it is
not possible to achieve a general conclusion.
Assuming that mTC increases with  ; from (2), the quality level q is such
that:
q0
 + q( + () ) = ()
w2
mTC
If  increases, as mTC decreases, q must increase.
An increase of  also inuences the existence of the di¤erent regimes. For
 given, it is straightforward from (10) that G() in an increasing function
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of  : As it could be expected, the region A in which no education occurs
increases with  : Consequently there is less space for regions B and C. The
frontier between regions B and C is dened with the function V (): As
V (1) = G(1);it appears that V (1) increases with  : From numerical experi-
ments, it seems true for every  that V () increases with  ; but the general
proof has not been reached. An numerical experiment is provided.
3.5 E¤ect of w0
w0 play a crucial role on education and fertility as it represents the opportu-
nity cost of the quantity of children. In writing equation (4) under the form
:
mTC =
() A()(q0)
 (w1+w0)
w0
  w2(w0) 1
q0(w0) 1 + ()
 A()(q0)
it is straightforward thatmTC is a decreasing function of w0 as the numerator
is decreasing and the denominator is increasing. Using the same argument,
mC given by (6) is also decreasing with respect to w0: Finally, when education
cancels out, equation (11) allows to write again ~mTC as
~mTC =
 
2

q 10
(w1+w0)
w0
(w0)
 1 +
 
2

q 10
which is decreasing with w0:
In all cases, fertility always decreases with respect to w0: This result is
intuitive as w0 is the opportunity cost of the time devoted to children. A
change of w0 can also result in a change of regime, and a drop of fertility.
Starting from the fertility level without education ~mTC ; an increase of w0
implies a decrease of fertility. This change of w0 may induce such a decrease
of fertility that it becomes optimal to invest in quality. At this point, there
is a discontinuity in fertility that experiences a fall between ~mTC and mTC :
In the neighborhood of the frontier value of w0; a small increase of w0 induce
a great fall of fertility. This jump is the consequence of the discrepancy
between the objective functions of self 1 and self 2.
The frontiers between the di¤erent regimes can be characterized with
respect to w0: They cannot be deduced from the preceding diagram as all
functions H; V and G depends on w0: The characterization is made in the
plan (w0; w1): As before, parameters are constrained such that (5) holds. This
constraint denes in the plan (w0; w1) a zona such that w1 > WH(w0); with
WH a function dened in appendix (). The following proposition summarizes
the results:
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Proposition 6 In the plan (w0; w1); it is possible to dene two functions
WG(w0) and W V (w0) satisfying the following properties:
 8w0; WG(w0) > W V (w0)
 WG(0) = W V (0) = 0
 WG(w0) andW V (w0) are either increasing functions, or U-shaped (rst
decreasing and then increasing).
For a given value of w1; three regimes are possible:
1. for w0 <
 
WG
 1
(w1); q
C = qTC = 0 and ~mC = ~mTC (Zone A)
2. for
 
WG
 1
(w1) < w0 <
 
W V
 1
(w1); q
TC = 0 but qC > 0 and
~m > mC (Zone B).
3. for
 
W V
 1
(w1) < w0 <
 
WH
 1
(w1); q
TC and qC are both positive,
with qTC < qC and mTC < mC (zone C).
The results obtained in this proposition are intuitive. For a low value of
w0; the opportunity cost of children is small. Fertility is high and parents
do not invest in quality. For an intermediate value of w0; the TC behavior
leads to no investment in quality, whereas parents invest in quality along the
commitment solution. Fertility is lower for the commitment solution. Finally,
for a high value of w0; the two solutions imply a positive investment in quality,
and fertility is higher for the commitment solution. A consequence of these
results for the TC behavior is that fertility experiences a strong discontinuity
for w0 =
 
W V
 1
(w1)  wl0: In the neighborhood of this value wl0, a small
increase of w0 leads to a large fall of fertility.
A simple numerical illustration is provided for the following values of
parameters :  = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:17;  = 0:5;  = 1; w2 = 2; q0 = 0:5;
w1 = 1: Figure 2 shows the di¤erent zones in the plan (w0; w1): Figure 3
shows how the fertility rates evolves with w0:
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Appendix 1
The comparison between mTCand mC is done in the text. In the case
 < 1; the comparison between qC(mC) and qTC(mTC) is simple and is maid
in the text. It remains to compare qC(mC) and qTC(mTC) when  > 1:
First, it appears that:
qTC(mTC) + qo =
(=)
 
w2
mTC
+ q0

1 + ()  1 
and
qC(mC) + qo =
(=)
 
w2
mC
+ q0

1 + ()  1 
From (4), it is obtained:
w2
mTC
+ q0 =
() A()B [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2 (15)
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From (6), it is obtained:
w2
mC
+ a+ q0 =
() A(1)B [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2 (16)
As A(1) = 1 +  1 ; it follows:
qTC(mTC) + qo < q
C(mC) + qo ,
()
1 + ()  1 
A()
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2 <
1
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2
(17)
After rearranging and using the expression of A(); it is possible to write
this inequality:
0 < B (w1 + w0) 
   w2f() (18)
with
f() 

1+1 
+1 

  1
1  
Firstly the inequality (18) is studied in a neighborhood of  = 1: In
setting x = ; a function g is introduced such that:
g(x) 

1+x1 
x1=+x1 

  1
1  x = f()
The limit of g when x tends toward 1 is equal to the limit of f in  = 1:
Dening a function h(x) such that:
h(x) 

1 + x 1 
x1= + x 1 

this limit is equal to  h0(1): Taking the derivative of the logarithm of h in
x = 1; it is obtained:
h0(1) = h0(1)=h(1) =
 1 
1 +  1 
  1 + 
 1 
1 +  1 
=   1
1 +  1 
Thus, in  = 1; (18) becomes:
0 < B (w1 + w0) 
   w2
1 +  1 
which is satised as it corresponds to (7) in  = 1: It is then proved that
qTC < qC in a neighborhood of  = 1:
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Second, the inequality (18) is studied for a low value of :When  tends
toward 0; f() tends to be innite, the inequality (18) cannot be satised,
and qTC > qC :  close to 0 is not possible as it implies negative values for
mTCand mC : The smallest possible value of  corresponds to the constraint
(5) ensuring mTC > 0: When  tends to this value, the left handside of (17)
tends to be innite. Thus, when  is low enough, (18) cannot be satised,
and qTC > qC :
Appendix 2
For that purpose, it is useful to dene the following functions WG; WZ ;
W V ; WD and WH such that:
w2
w1 + w0
> G(), w1 < WG(w0)
w2
w1 + w0
> Z(), w1 < WZ(w0)
w2
w1 + w0
> V (), w1 < W V (w0)
w2
w1 + w0
> D(), w1 < WD(w0)
w2
w1 + w0
< H(), w1 > WH(w0)
W V is implicitly dened by (14). WG; WZ ; WD andWH have explicit forms:
WG(w0) =

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0) ()

WZ(w0) =

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0)


1 +  1 
 +  1 

WD(w0) =

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0)

WH(w0) =
w2(w0)

(q0) ()

(1 +  1 ) 1 
1 +  1 1 
   w0
By denition, these functions satisfy, for all w0 :
WG(w0) > W
Z(w0) > W
V (w0) > W
D(w0)
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